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 Abstract 
During the multifaceted crisis that has befallen Zimbabwe since 2000 the plight of the people 
has been manifest in a shrinking employment market, triple or four digit inflation, a sometime 
dearth of available commodities, rising child mortality rates and falling life expectancy - to the 
worst female life expectancy in the world - and a governance crisis experienced as political 
violence, uncertainty and cultural and social isolationism. Many popular and academic 
papers have bemoaned and discussed these symptoms of crisis.  
 
The fieldwork from which this paper derives, in November to December 2006, was carried 
out in the context of the above, just after an exercise in currency renewal, where three zeros 
were removed, in a state suffering the excesses of state propaganda and fear. Some of the 
data is corrupted by this numeric confusion and fear induced unwillingness to respond to 
strangers’ questions. However, the core of the dataset is sufficiently rigorous to suggest 
important validations and new observations which extend the analysis of our 2006 paper on 
Remittances in Zimbabwe (GPRG, Working Paper No. 45). This paper reaffirms the central 
importance of remittances to household wellbeing, reproduction and even survival. It 
provides new data on the expanding cross-border, non-pecuniary goods economy; data on a 
shrinking formal sector; an increasing unwillingness on the part of remitters to use 
commercial companies, banks or friends and relatives to transit remittances and thus a 
shrinking institutional base for the political economy of remittances. In other words, reliance 
on the personal physical carriage of money has grown as trust in other individuals and firms 
has shrunk during a period of deep and extended crisis.  This serves to arrest any undue 
romanticism about the ability of an informal sector to emerge in direct compensation and 
competition to an ossified formal sector: all institutions are in crisis and the new informal 
remittance transfer systems (IRTS) are no exception. However, the resourcefulness of 
people in crisis continues to astound, despite these activities not resulting in concretised new 
institutions.  
 
We conclude that a model of a political economy of dispossession can be drawn around our 
empirics to give both a metaphorical and deeper conceptual understanding of this distal, 
multi-nodal economy of international remittances, which is critical to the survival of 
Zimbabweans at the current time. 
 
Keywords: migration, poverty, remittances, informalisation, Zimbabwe, political economy, 
dispossession. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
“I am looking after five orphans left by my children.  I wish I could get assistance to send 
them to school and also provide them with food and clothing.  My cottage and tuckshop were 
both destroyed by Operation Murambatsvina.” (2006)                                 
“It is my utmost prayer that God takes care of my husband and keep him away from immoral 
behaviour.  It is very hard to maintain distant relationships these days of many trials.  Many 
people are dying of HIV/AIDS.   (2006)                                         
  "I long to be with my wife here in Zimbabwe, but life in Zimbabwe is so bad that if she 
comes back here our family will starve of hunger.  Families are being forced to separate 
unnecessarily just because of man-made economic mismanagement."  (2006)              
“We just pray our children will not be repatriated back because life is very rough here.” 
(2006) 
“Things are so hard that we are now leading an abnormal kind of life.  It was unheard of 
during our days that a woman would spend most of her time in a foreign country working for 
the family.  It is unfortunate that we are gradually losing our manhood, even the very kind of 
respect we used to get as husbands.” (2006)      
"Our life requires supplementary assistance otherwise we cannot survive as human beings 
created in the image of God."   (2006) 
"Money received from abroad is no longer useful when compared to the cost of living in 
Zimbabwe.  The government should promote the informal sector to supplement what we get 
from our relatives working outside the country."    (2006) 
Life is getting hard everyday.  Had it not been help that we get from the relatives in Diaspora, 
we would not be here.   (2006) 
"We just feel sorry for our children because they now carry extra burdens.  When we grew 
up, life used to be easy and manageable, but today it's no longer the same."  (2006)        
"I have nothing to add because it makes no difference.  Our life has gone beyond our 
capacity or ability.  The haves will continue having more, while the have nots will continue 
getting poorer and poorer.” (2006)                                                                                                                             
That remittances are critical to household wellbeing in Zimbabwe (International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2004; Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) and elsewhere 
has been clearly established by a mature and burgeoning literature (for example, 
Mutume, 2005). Indeed, it has become a commonplace in the research area of migration 
and development, and its subfield of poverty reduction and remittance studies, that 
international migration can have a positive impact on poverty reduction through the 
generation of migrant remittances (Skeldon, 1997, 2002; Kothari, 2002; De Haas, 2005; 
Adams and Page, 2005; Department for International Developent (DfID), 2007), and, for 
the vast majority of researchers, that remittances are positively associated with 
economic growth (see Adams and Page, 2005). Within international development, much 
hope has been invested that remittances provide an accessible pathway out of poverty, 
and an alternative to inter-governmental and official systems of development assistance 
(IOM, 2007). 
This generally positive view does, however, have strong detractors, particularly over the 
role remittances can play in exacerbating social and economic inequality (reviewed in 
Bracking, 2003; Hansen, 2004 on Somalia; Ghosh, 2006), and given the particular 
vulnerabilities experienced by remitters themselves (Datta et al, 2006; Akuei, 2005). 
Additionally, for sub-Saharan Africa, the evidence of positive developmental impact 
 remains particularly sketchy, if not illustrative (see de Hann, 2000: 17), partly because of 
data unavailability, and partly because the results of econometric analysis, such as 
Adams and Page (2005), is correspondingly questionable, as it becomes heavily 
weighted in aggregation to the experience of other regions. However, this working paper 
does not seek to contribute directly to this wider debate on the contribution of 
remittances to economic development (from the seminal Stark et al 1986; reviewed in 
Bracking, 2003; Maimbo and Ratha, 2005): it is evidentially much more demanding than 
our small data set can manage. We aim instead to add to the small but growing data on 
sub-Saharan Africa and Zimbabawe in particular. 
Suffice to note that unsubstantiated optimism was generated by widely cited large 
remittance figures, and an overly positive interpretation of them until quite recently. 
Large headline figures were considered outside of the context of working economies 
(see Cohen 2005), while attribution and aggregation problems in large data sets, such 
as in Adams and Page (2005) hide the specific circumstances of structurally isolated 
economies where many of the poorest people live (Gore, 2003), many of which are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (Grant et al, 2004). In these, we can expect that productive 
absorption of this type of incoming investment into the formal economy will be much 
lower (Newland, 2003; Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006), although this too remains 
under-researched (see De Haas, 2005: 1274; Khadria, 2002: 25). Mhone (2001) wrote 
convincingly of the structural duality and enclave nature of political economies in 
southern Africa, which again suggests that the productive absorption of remittance 
incomes here would be questionable and highly contextual. The research here is carried 
out where all these cautionary factors pertain. 
In any case, remittances of goods and money - and skills and services, although these 
latter are not covered by our research – in their multitude of individual acts of charity and 
care, add up to a truly global network of transactions (see Zinyama, 2002 on Zimbabwe; 
Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen, 2004).  Networks are particularly difficult to evaluate in any 
simple cost-benefit type analysis. Remittance networks have their own institutions in the 
wider sense: context specific and localised firms and internet-based systems, norms and 
codes of behaviour and shared understandings. Geographers talk of complex and 
interdependent webs of human behaviour built on remittance sending and receipt (Koser 
and Al-Ali, 2001; Black and King, 2004), while Özden and Schiff (2006) reviewed the 
literature on the effect of these complex networks on the sending societies. The network 
is symptomatic of peoples’ persistent attempt to liberalise movement and the global 
labour market as a response to both economic crisis and economic opportunity under 
processes generated by the globalisation of capital, industrial manufacture, and iconic 
cultural consumption. Within this general response to globalisation, each particular 
remittance sending community has its own nodal points and social practices which have 
multiple effects on the society not just left behind but carried along and transformed. 
How far remittances can affect and underpin transformative social change is core to a 
number of ongoing research projects. For example, Bailey et al (2008) promise an 
exploration of the spatiality of the transnational practice of remittance sending and 
receipt for the Zimbabwean Diaspora living in West Yorkshire, in cognisance of its 
multifaceted, social, material, cultural, and symbolic meanings (they cite Massey, 2005; 
Featherstone et al, 2007). 
Our case study illustrates more about basic survival and privatised social protection in a 
period of economic contraction, which is embedded in our urban suburbs of Zimbabwe, 
 even though our remitters are dispersed globally1. How far our empirics are illustrative of 
wider processes of social survival, change and meaning remains an open question at 
the current stage of the work, although some tentative observations have emerged 
around this theme. The specificity of our research centres on how individuals and 
households have responded in Zimbabwe to an extended period of economic crisis and 
retreat by the state into ‘spoils politics’ (see Allen, 1999). We have found that optimism 
surrounding the ability of individuals to build institutions, de facto, if not de jure, in 
periods of crisis to substitute for those formal sector ones which have been functionally 
lost, must be tempered by a realistic acknowledgement of the limitations desperate and 
poor people face during such periods. Instead, an understandable widespread social 
and cultural implosion occurs in the everyday life of people, which remittances, though 
acts of solidarity, can only temper, not solve. We discuss some of the methodological 
challenges of this research in the next section, and return to the wider links with 
processes of informalisation and malign politics in section 4. 
 
2. Methodological challenges 
 
This paper reports on a second round of household sampling in the suburbs of Harare 
and Bulawayo in November 2006, repeating with only minor changes a sampling survey 
first carried out in those same suburbs in 2005 (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006). 
Because of security concerns we did not keep a record of the names or addresses of our 
original 300 households, but instead sampled another 300 in the same districts. Since 
we have income and demographic data we can match these two samples together and 
for the purposes of comparison view them as commensurate within measurable margins 
of error. 
The purpose of the second survey was to review changes in migrant remittance sending 
and receipt statistics, and review the changes since 2005. We wanted to take a 
particular note of changes which would indicate a higher state of crisis in the economy; 
increased informalisation of economic activity; the rate of dollarisation in the informal 
economy; and changes to households’ living standards as these relate to receipt of 
remittances. There was also an objective to review how the various sectors and 
institutions of the remittance economy; the informal sector money couriers, the internet 
based money exchangers, the informal commercial companies and cargo carriers had 
grown or shrunk in relation to their formal sector comparators and to review the basic 
organisational contours of a parallel economy in the midst of a governance crisis. We 
had relatively more success with these research objectives, than those, (below), which 
require extrapolation from our case study data set up to a wider geographic referent, 
such as the political nation, or the generic case of the role of remittances in ameliorating 
economic crisis. 
                                                 
1 Unfortunately, we are not able to pair our respondents to their relatives who send, since they are 
anonymous, and we have insufficient resources. This type of research might be highly fruitful to the 
literature. Important work on the UK Diaspora’s remittance behaviour has been carried out by McGregor, 
2007; Bloch: 2005, 2006, 2008; and Mbiba, 2005) among others. 
 There are also a number of other methodological objections of which we are aware2. 
The first is that this type of quantification add to nothing but an empiricism on which it is 
impossible to build theoretical concepts and categories; that the ‘scaling up’ problem is 
particularly acute in this case as Zimbabwe is seen as sui generis - a unique case; that 
the link made between the micro-level research and macro level questions is 
theoretically inadequate; that complexity is actually denied as the relationship between 
the revenue base in an economy and the state form pertaining is complex and context 
specific, thwarting generalisation; even the conclusions at a micro-level are inconclusive 
and contradictory, suggesting both a welfarist moment of redistribution of income North 
to South, and a system which reinforces and exacerbates inequality (see Hansen, 2004 
on Somaliland). We will return to some of these in the concluding section. 
A second purpose of the second round of surveying was to create some temporal 
comparisons which might enable us to begin to model the political economy of 
remittances, and the degree to which this can be taken as a proxy measure for a wider 
distal political economy of dispossession. To do this we needed data on how the 
institutions which underpin the sending and receipt of remittances had changed during 
the year; whether and in what ways institutionalisation within the spatial economy had 
occurred or remained constant; and how far the individual agents’ participant in the 
exchange had regularised or changed their behaviour. We discuss this further in section   
4 below, with reference to some seminal theoretical texts on the concept of a political 
economy of dispossession, or its related term, displacement. We prefer to use the term 
‘dispossession’, since it reflects the underlying reasons why many migrants moved, even 
the skilled ones when the professional economy shrunk from 2000 in Zimbabwe, and 
why remittances remain so important to wellbeing in relation to an economy where the 
state class systematically disassembles independent accumulation or wealth creation. 
We conclude that our remittances provide liquidity for a relatively constant political 
economy of dispossession, whose loci are many, and which has nodal points of 
exchange dispersed internationally. 
As with any case study research, in this second line of enquiry, we encountered the 
problem of measurement of how far our findings can be viewed as representative of a 
wider whole: whether the illustrative data can be used to answer, in some part at least, 
our wider research question of whether remittances illuminate the materiality underlying 
a particular mode of accumulation, or political economy of dispossession. This requires 
that our case study remittance research be used to proxy, or map, the ‘materialism of 
everyday life’ in our Zimbabwean households. This may be overambitious with our size 
of sample set, so we limit ourselves to proposing further lines of inquiry which are 
suggested by the data. 
 
3. Demographics and household incomes 
 
In some respects the results of the two surveys were very similar. For example a static 
50 per cent of our households were in receipt of remittances in both years. In other 
respects they showed difference, such that the number of remittance receiving 
                                                 
2 Some acknowledgement here is deserved by anonymous reviewers of the ESRC/DfID Programme Call 
2007, who helped to schematise our methodological challenges. One concluded “Remittances are 
notoriously difficult to research empirically and measurement problems are only compounded where any 
derived and indirect effects are concerned……..[they will experience problems of] validity, reliability and 
generalisability” 
 
 households in Mabelreign had reduced substantially. We will review the data from the 
2006 survey and comparative results in the next section, before returning to these rather 
larger suggestions of meaning resulting from reviewing that data. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
The mean age of our respondents in 2005 was 37 from a highly varied sample (n=297; 
sd. 18), while in 2006 this was 38 (n=300; sd = 15). The median age in 2005 was 33, 
while in 2006 it was also 33. In both sampling exercises the respondents were only 
identified by alias and suburb, so exact tracing of respondents was not carried out. 
However, the sampling was carried out in the same suburbs, and the two samples can 
be seen as relatively comparable by a number of demographics – by age, sex and 
income.  
 
Table 1: Gender and location of respondent, 2005 and 2006 
 
   Mabelreign Highfield Glencara  Nkulumane  Mabelreign 
2005 Male 29 38 43 27 137
    39.2% 50.7% 47.3% 45.0% 45.7%
  Female 45 37 48 33 163
    60.8% 49.3% 52.7% 55.0% 54.3%
   74 75 91 60 300
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100 %
    
2006 Male 31 28 31 39 129
    41.3% 37.3% 47.7% 45.9% 43.0%
  Female 44 47 34 46 171
    58.7% 62.7% 52.3% 54.1% 57.0%
   75 75 65 85 300
  Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
*includes Parklands and Mahatsula 
**and Khumalo in 2006 
 
Low density Bulawayo includes 25 households from Khumalo in the 2006 sample, 
although this suburb did not feature in 2005. The 2006 data includes 6 households from 
Parklands, also coded as low density Bulawayo (3), while the 2005 survey also included 
24 households from Parklands. In 2005, 26 households from Selbourne Park were 
included in low density Bulawayo, but none from this area in 2006. Taken together, we 
interviewed 44.3 % men and 55.7% women over the two years. 
 
The commensurability of the two surveys by income is a more confused picture. We tried 
to index link the bands used in the 2005 survey reproduced in the table below, to 
matched values in 2006. Either this exercise inflated the value of the 2006 incomes, or 
our sample set had become richer. It might also be the case that remittance income has 
become regularised such that people include this in their estimates of their household 
income, whereas in 2005 they did not include it. Additionally, the survey period (October 
to November 2006) occurred shortly after the revaluation of the ZWD through removing 3 
zeroes. This could have affected the calculation of incomes and other receipts, as 
households struggled with understanding the value of the new money. What had been 1 
million ZWD had become 1000 ZWD. However, there seems to be a marked clustering 
 of Bulawayo incomes around a higher average in 2006 than in 2005, and higher than 
Harare equivalents, which may be related to an increase in remittances received in 2006 
in high density Bulawayo. It may also, however, be related to a build up of household 
assets from an earlier period of remittances, which is difficult to statistically explore when 
the households are not identical, the time period lapsed in only one year and the sample 
is relatively small. There are also fewer high density area households included in the 
2006 data for Bulawayo than in 2005, who return household data, partly due to the 
inclusion of Khumalo households in the 2006 set, skewing the whole dataset’s incomes 
upward. 
 
Table 2: Monthly average household income in 2005 and 2006 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Less than Zim$ 1 mill per month 45 24 69
  17.9% 8.5% 12.9%
Above Zim$ 1 mill and below Zim$ 4 mill per month 85 67 152
  33.7% 23.7% 28.4%
Above Zim$ 4 mill and below Zim$7 mill per month 40 52 92
  15.9% 18.4% 17.2%
Above Zim$7 mill and below Zim$ 10 mill per month 30 56 86
  11.9% 19.8% 16.1%
Above Zim$10 mill per month 21 64 85
  8.3% 22.6% 15.9%
No response / refusal 31 20 51
  12.3% 7.1% 9.5%
Total 252 283 535
 100% 100% 100%
This can be viewed as below: 
 
Figure 1: Monthly average household income in 2005 and 2006 
 Monthly average household income
No response / 
refusal
Above 10 mill / 
month
Above 7 mill & 
below  10 mill / 
month
Above 4 mill & 
below 7 mill / 
month
Above 1 mill & 
below 4 mill / 
month
Less than 1 mill / 
month
C
ou
nt
100
80
60
40
20
0
Bar Chart
2006
2005
year of interview 2005 
or 2006
 
The income data by suburb and year is in Table 3  
  Table 3: Monthly average household income by type of suburb in 2005 and 2006 
 
 
 2005 
Low density 
Harare 
High density 
Harare 
Low density 
Bulawayo 
High density 
Bulawayo Total 
Chronic poor  24.4 57.8 2.2 15.6 100
Poor  35.3 49.4 2.4 12.9 100
Working 47.5 12.5 22.5 17.5 100
Professional 20.0 .0 63.3 16.7 100
Above Zim$10 mill per month 23.8 .0 71.4 4.8 100
No response / refusal 9.7 6.5 41.9 41.9 100
 Total  29.4 29.8 23.4 17.5 100
Source: Own survey data 
All in percentages 
Chronic poor: Less than Zim$ 1 mill per month; Poor: Above Zim$ 1 mill and below Zim$ 4 mill per month; Working:  
Above Zim$ 4 mill and below Zim$7 mill per month; Professional: Above Zim$7 mill and below Zim$ 10 mill per month 
 
 
2006 
 
Low density 
Harare 
High density 
Harare 
Low density 
Bulawayo 
High density 
Bulawayo Total 
Chronic poor 58.3 37.5 .0 4.2 100
Poor 40.3 53.7 1.5 4.5 100
Working 30.8 34.6 11.5 23.1 100
Professional 17.9 16.1 30.4 35.7 100 
Above Zim$10 mill per month 9.4 4.7 60.9 25.0 100
No response / refusal 5.0 .0 75.0 20.0 100
74 75 78 56 283 Total  
26.1 26.5 27.6 19.8 100
 
 
 Figure 2: Monthly average household income in 2005 and 2006 by suburb 
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 4. Receipt of goods and money 
 
The number of households receiving goods or money from relatives who were away was 
remarkably constant between the years 2005 and 2006 at roughly half. 
 
Table 4: Receiving households, 2005 and 2006  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Yes 149 152 301
  49.7% 50.7% 50.2%
No 149 148 297
  49.7% 49.3% 49.5%
don't know 2 0 2
  .7% .0% .3%
Total 300 300 600
 100% 100% 100%
Source: Own survey data. 
 
In 2006 we asked a new question of whether the household had a close family member 
living away, as a separate question, before we asked whether they received money from 
(that) family member away. Unfortunately this was not asked in 2005, but was included 
in 2006 to give an indication of how many ‘failed’ migrations there are, that is from the 
perspectives of those left behind, those migrations which do not result in remittances. Of 
the 2006 households, 172 reported a relative away, or 57.3 per cent, as compared with 
152, or 50.7 per cent who then reported a successful remitter. Thus only 20 migrants 
failed to send money home. Exactly 50 per cent of the surveyed households, with 2005 
and 2006 together, had remitters. By suburb the number of relatives sending money 
and/or goods is shown in table 5.  
 
Table 5a: Households receiving goods and/or money by type of suburb, 2005 and 
2006  
 
  
2005 
Low 
density 
Harare 
High 
density 
Harare 
Low 
density 
Bulaway
o 
High 
density 
Bulaway
o Total 
Yes 58 40 25 26 149
 78.4% 53.3% 27.5% 43.3% 49.7%
No 16 35 64 34 149
   21.6% 46.7% 70.3% 56.7% 49.7%
 don't know 0 0 2 0 2
 .0% .0% 2.2% .0% .7%
Total 74 75 91 60 300
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Own survey data. 
 
 
Table 5b: Households receiving goods and/or money by type of suburb, 2006 
 
 2006 
Low 
density 
Harare 
High 
density 
Harare 
Low 
density 
Bulaway
o 
High 
density 
Bulaway
o Total 
Yes 32 34 38 48 152
   42.7% 45.3% 58.5% 56.5% 50.7%
 No 43 41 27 37 148
   57.3% 54.7% 41.5% 43.5% 49.3%
Total 75 75 65 85 300
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Own survey data. 
 
 
Significant here seems to be the drop in receivers in the low density suburbs of Harare, 
from 78.4 per cent in 2005, to 42.7 per cent in 2006, which could be because of the 
maturity of migration demographics, as relatives join the migrant in their new country of 
domicile. Perhaps wives and children have managed to join them as they accumulate 
rights and social capital in the new country. Otherwise, this could be interpreted as a 
forgetful group of migrants who have stopped sending, or a group which illustrates the 
‘remittances decay hypothesis’ observed elsewhere, that remittances decline as time 
spent away lengthens (Brown and Foster, 1995: 38; see also Bryceson and Vuorela, 
2002). Thus the low density Harare remitters seem to have reduced their gifts, while the 
high density Bulawayo remitters have increased theirs. Does this mean that the absence 
of remitters in 2005 in Bulawayo led to higher incomes? Or that the high number of 
remitters in 2006 means that they have higher incomes?   
 
Figure 3: Households receiving goods and/or money by type of suburb, 2005 and 
2006 
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One hypothesis would be that the lower number of remitters in the low density Harare 
suburbs is due to demographic changes, around the continued emigration of family 
members. Taking just the sub sample of low density Harare residents the drop off in 
remitters is large – 58 to 32 in 2005 and 2006 respectively – against a fairly constant 
distribution of household income shares in our banded income brackets. Close relatives 
transferring money seem to have shrunk, supporting our hypothesis that families may 
have rejoined. For example, 21 sons and daughters were primary senders in 2005, 
whereas only 6 sons and daughters were sole senders in 2006, while of 10 mothers or 
fathers who were sole senders in 2005, only 1 singularly maintained a household in 
2006. However, there may also be a bleaker picture here of reduced levels of transfer 
altogether between relatives that have not rejoined, for example, 3 cousins, 3 aunts and 
uncles have disappeared to no observations in these categories, while 6 brothers or 
sisters have reduced to 1. Obviously, these are not the same people, but number of 
observations in that category of relationship between the receiver and the sender. It is 
theoretically possible that the drop in the number of sole senders be offset by 
households receiving money from more than one person. However, this too had 
dropped: in Harare’s low density suburbs in 2005, 29 households claimed to be receiving 
money from more than one person, but in 2006 this had dropped to only 11 households.  
 
 
Figure 4: Senders to Mabelreign in 2005 and 2006 
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Across the whole dataset in 2005, of the households reporting a single primary sender, 
there were 18 spouses who were sending money, 10 to Highfield alone, but by 2006 this 
had dropped to none. Sons and daughters were much more constant, at 39 in 2005, and 
32 in 2006, although within locations this varied more, as the data for low density Harare 
demonstrates.   
 
However, a closer inspection of the ‘other’ answers, where respondents record multiple 
senders and where spouses may be hidden alongside aunts, uncles and so on, shows 
that a more complex picture pertains, with a rise in households receiving from multiple 
senders. For example, in 2005 there were 2 siblings mentioned in the other category, 
making, with those siblings who were sole senders (23) a total of 25 persons; while in 
2006 there were only 2 siblings named as sole senders, but a full 31 brothers and sisters 
mentioned by households receiving from more than one sender, making a total of 33 
sibling senders, more than in 2005. However, as table 9 illustrates, in all the other three 
categories – parent, spouse and child, the total number of senders  - those mentioned a 
primary senders and senders within multiple answers – had dropped. 
 
 
Table 8: Relationship to primary sender of goods and/or money in 2005 or 2006  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Spouse 18 0 18 
  12.1% .0% 8.0% 
Son or daughter 39 32 71 
  26.2% 41.6% 31.4% 
 Mother and father 18 4 22 
  12.1% 5.2% 9.7% 
Employer / absent household 
head 7 1 8 
  4.7% 1.3% 3.5% 
Cousin 8 0 8 
  5.4% .0% 3.5% 
Uncle or aunt 7 1 8 
  4.7% 1.3% 3.5% 
Adoptive parent 1 0 1 
  .7% .0% .4% 
Close family friend 6 0 6 
  4.0% .0% 2.7% 
Brother or sister 23 2 25 
  15.4% 2.6% 11.1% 
Other 22 37 59 
  14.8% 48.1% 26.1% 
Total 149 77 226 
 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Table 9: Relationship to sender: total numbers in 2005 and 2006 
 
2005 2006  
named as 
primary 
sender 
Mentioned by a 
household with 
multiple 
senders 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
named as 
primary 
sender 
Mentioned by 
a household 
with multiple 
senders 
 
 
 
 
 
Total 
Parent  18 2 20 4 7 11
Sibling  23 2 25 2 31 33
Spouse 18 4 22 0 9 9
Child 39 6 45 32 6 38
 
Thus while the ‘other’ category has risen from 22 to 37 between 2005 and 2006, 
indicating a rise in multiple answers – that is, in those households with more than one 
primary sender - the drop in observations of households with a primary sender, in the 
close relatives’ categories, cannot be offset by and increase in multiple numbers of 
senders who would include these people. In other words, close relatives sending money 
were fewer overall, even though households had managed to diversify their sources of 
revenue from those away. This is probably the case of gaining smaller rewards from a 
greater number of people, in the absence of a primary sender, again suggesting that 
nuclear family structures may have rejoined elsewhere. Overall, alongside the data 
suggesting that the regularity of remittances has declined, and monthly receipts are 
fewer, this demographic assessment would strongly suggest that remittances 
themselves declined in 2006, perhaps because of the tougher times faced by the 
remitters themselves. Here, triangulated research with senders as well as receivers 
would be ideal in order to test this suggestion.  
  
5. More details of senders and receivers 
 
In our paper on the 2005 data set we pointed to a fairly standardised and widespread 
pattern of monthly remittances based on migrations of a household head. The 2006 data 
set by comparison shows a large drop in receipts for the ‘in the last month category, from 
66.4 % in 2005, to 18.2 % in 2006, although this was probably associated with the 
financial turmoil pertaining at the time. The proportion of houses with senders was 
identified as fairly constant between the two years, but the question of when they last 
actually sent money shows a more depressing picture, with the 2006 households more 
predominantly in the longer ago categories. For example a full 20.3 per cent reported 
that the receipt had been in the last five years, as opposed to only 3.4 per cent in 2005.  
  
 
Table 10: Temporality of receipt by year of interview 
 
 
2005 2006 Total 
Last week 13 11 24
  8.9% 7.4% 8.2%
Last month 97 27 124
  66.4% 18.2% 42.2%
Last year 22 55 77
  15.1% 37.2% 26.2%
Last 5 years 5 30 35
  3.4% 20.3% 11.9%
Over 5 years 9 25 34
  6.2% 16.9% 11.6%
146 148 294Total 
100% 100% 100%
 
 
Between 2005 and 2006, the number of primary senders located in South Africa  had 
risen from 22.7  per cent to 27.8  per cent of senders, but had dropped for the UK from 
24.7 per cent to 18.5  per cent of all senders. The increased proportion of remitters 
based in South Africa as compared to the UK could be a reflection that migration to the 
former has continued to increase while that to the latter has stabilized. 
 
For Mabelreign, the actual number of senders in the UK had dropped from 23 to 10 
persons; was constant for South Africa (8 and 7 respectively); and for high density 
Harare the number of senders in South Africa had dropped from 17 to 13, but in UK had 
risen from 6 to 9. In low density Bulawayo the number of senders internationally had also 
risen for both South Africa, UK and America, although the most significant change 
between the two years was for the location of senders for high density Bulawayo, where 
the number in South Africa had risen from 4 to 14. There was a higher proportion of 
respondents who had seen their relatives within the last year in 2006 (41.7 per cent), as 
compared to in 2005 (35.9 per cent). There were more coming home every month (23.3 
per cent compared to 18.9 per cent) in 2006, but less coming home every year (19.3  per 
cent compared to 27 per cent), although 14 per cent reported that their relative returned 
every Christmas in 2006 as opposed to only 8.8 per cent in 2005. 
  
Table 11: Return visits by year of interview 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Every week 1 8 9 
  .7% 5.3% 3.0% 
Every month 28 35 63 
  18.9% 23.3% 21.1% 
Every year 40 29 69 
  27.0% 19.3% 23.2% 
Every Christmas 13 21 34 
  8.8% 14.0% 11.4% 
School holidays 0 2 2 
  .0% 1.3% .7% 
Less than once a year 21 19 40 
  14.2% 12.7% 13.4% 
never 31 15 46 
  20.9% 10.0% 15.4% 
Don't know 2 0 2 
  1.4% .0% .7% 
Specify 12 21 33 
  8.1% 14.0% 11.1% 
Total 148 150 298 
 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
6. The process of sending and exchange in the goods economy 
 
The way in which the household received the last money or goods has some significant 
changes between 2005 and 2006. In particular, the direct transit of goods with the 
sender themselves on a visit home had risen from 38.2 per cent to 50 per cent, while the 
use of persons known to the household had dropped from 34.5 per cent to only 15.8 per 
cent, suggesting that people were increasingly preferring the means of transit with the 
most control and security against theft or misadventure. This hypothesis is also 
supported by a slight increase in people going to fetch the goods.3 The only 
countervailing trend was an increased use of the post office.  
 
Table 12: How did you get the last item you received?  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Brought by the migrant relative on a visit home 42 60 102
  38.2% 50.0% 44.3%
Brought by another person known to the household 38 19 57
  34.5% 15.8% 24.8%
Sent by an informal courier who was not known to the hh 4 8 12
                                                 
3 There were also more ‘went to fetch it’ in the ‘other’ category, but not clear whether these were actually 
from the person directly, or from an intermediate point, that is from where the goods were located, but where 
they had been paid for remotely by the sender. 
   3.6% 6.7% 5.2%
Sent in the post 8 13 21
  7.3% 10.8% 9.1%
Someone went to fetch it from where the relative works 7 9 16
  6.4% 7.5% 7.0%
Someone met the person sending it 3 1 4
  2.7% .8% 1.7%
Employed commercial cargo company 7 1 8
  6.4% .8% 3.5%
Other 1 9 10
  .9% 7.5% 4.3%
Total 110 120 230
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
The dominant explanation for the choice of mode of transit had shifted between 2005 
and 2006, where ‘because it was most convenient’ (polling 50.5 per cent) in 2005, to an 
equal split between ‘most secure’ and ‘most convenient’ (both at 32.1 per cent) in 2006. 
In 2005, only 9.9 per cent had cited safety and security as the principle explanation for 
the choice of transit method.  
 
There had been a slight increase in the receipt of goods as a direct response to a 
request from the household from 30 per cent in 2005 to 33.6 per cent in 2006. 
Additionally, there was a higher number of households in 2006 reporting that the receipt 
of goods was a regular rather than one off event (52.5  per cent and 46.7  per cent 
respectively) as opposed to in 2005 (38.2  per cent and 59.1 per cent respectively). 
 
 
Table 13: Explanations for choice of mode of transit of goods, 2005 and 2006 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Cheapest 4 6 10
  4.0% 7.4% 5.5%
Safest/most 
secure 10 26 36
  9.9% 32.1% 19.8%
Most convenient 51 26 77
  50.5% 32.1% 42.3%
Fastest 7 7 14
  6.9% 8.6% 7.7%
Other 29 16 45
  28.7% 19.8% 24.7%
Total 101 81 182
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 
7. Importance to the households of the goods sent 
 
 The measures of importance to the household begin with whether the item was food 
which would not otherwise have been consumed, which remained the same between the 
two years with a not statistically significant change. Similarly, with the measure of 
clothing importance, there was little change between the two years, suffice to add that in 
both years households recorded that goods received were of critical importance to them. 
However, people answering ‘no’ to the question of whether the goods sent were ‘an 
additional thing the household could have done without’, had risen between 2005 and 
2006 from 67.6 per cent to 89.8 per cent. Asked whether another item would have been 
more useful than the one sent, 85.3 per cent answered ‘no’ in 2006, as compared to 
79.6 per cent in 2005, suggesting a slightly higher degree of matching between goods 
sent and household need. Similarly, in 2006, a full 94.7 per cent answered that nothing 
else would have been more desirable than the goods sent, rising from 89.4 per cent in 
2005.  
 
8. The process of sending and exchange in the money economy 
 
The degree of heightened matching to expressed need for goods sent was matched by a 
heightened degree of regularisation of money payments sent between 2005 and 2006. 
When asked whether the receipt of money was regular, 89.1 per cent replied yes in 2006 
as compared to 81.7 per cent in 2005.  However, the number actually receiving regular 
and frequent amounts of money seems to have dropped between the two years, 
showing a potential error in peoples’ perception, or indicating that we are correct to 
assume that the direct circumstances in which the survey was carried out had 
interrupted that months’ flows in an unrepresentative way. 
 
 
Table 14: When money was received by year  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Last week 12 9 21
  9.2% 7.0% 8.1%
Last month 93 25 118
  71.0% 19.5% 45.6%
Last year 12 39 51
  9.2% 30.5% 19.7%
Last 5 years 3 29 32
  2.3% 22.7% 12.4%
Over 5 years 11 26 37
  8.4% 20.3% 14.3%
Total 131 128 259
 100% 100% 100%
 
Thus the data on when the money was actually received is contradicted when 
respondents were asked how often money is sent: more said every month than reported 
actually having received money in the last month. 
 
Table 15: Regularity of receipts reported by households  
 
  2005 2006 Total 
Every week 0 3 3
  .0% 2.4% 1.2%
Every month 87 95 182
  73.7% 76.6% 75.2%
Every year 16 13 29
  13.6% 10.5% 12.0%
Less than once per year 0 1 1
  .0% .8% .4%
Other 15 12 27
  12.7% 9.7% 11.2%
Total 118 124 242
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
When asked when the payments to the household began there was a definite trend 
toward longer ago when comparing the 2005 and 2006 responses, suggesting fewer 
migrations leading to remittances in the immediate past pertaining to the 2006 survey. 
This also suggests that the high concentration of flight migrations recorded in the post – 
2000 period, explored in our earlier paper (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006), are still 
resulting in a preponderance of successful remitters - who have now been away a year 
longer.  
 
 
Table 16: Longevity of payments  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Last month 2 0 2 
  1.7% .0% .8% 
About 6 months ago 9 3 12 
  7.7% 2.5% 5.0% 
About 1 year ago 18 34 52 
  15.4% 28.1% 21.8% 
Between 1 and 5 years 
ago 58 57 115 
  49.6% 47.1% 48.3% 
More than 5 years ago 18 18 36 
  15.4% 14.9% 15.1% 
Other 12 9 21 
  10.3% 7.4% 8.8% 
Total 117 121 238 
 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
When asked how the sender got the payment to the household, again there was a 
dramatic drop, as there had been with goods sent, of those using a relative or family 
friend, suggesting the trust in such relationships had been worn out. The number of 
senders using bank accounts had also dropped dramatically, and in person exchange 
 had risen accordingly and in compensation. In other words, informal networks, informal 
commercial companies, and the formal sector institutions were providing a smaller 
magnitude of transmission services to migrants and their households in 2006, compared 
with 2005. Western Union was used by 14 people in 2005, who were willing to reply to 
the question, as opposed to only 1 in 2006, who was in any case referring to a dated 
receipt, since Western Union was included in a government ban on formal sector Money 
Transfer Agencies (MTAs) which was active during the survey period.  
 
The significant drop in those using formal sector banks, corresponds in some degree to 
an increase in receivers relying on informal money changers – over 40 per cent of 
households (see Table 20 below), which includes these 43 per cent who received the 
money by the person coming home - subsequently used an informal sector money 
changer. This signifies the ever greater and unrealistic gap between official and parallel 
rates during the survey period. It also suggests a consolidation of the parallel market 
compared to earlier years. 
 
When we asked households why the sender had used this method to transfer the 
money, convenience had dropped relative to safety as the overarching explanation. In 
the multiple answers given in the ‘other’ category, the 2006 responses also feature 
security predominantly, and more so than even in 2005.  
 
 
Table 17: Modes of transit of money by senders, 2005 and 2006  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
In person 31 56 87
  23.5% 43.4% 33.3%
Relative/family friend 42 25 67
  31.8% 19.4% 25.7%
Courier 4 7 11
  3.0% 5.4% 4.2%
To bank account 25 8 33
  18.9% 6.2% 12.6%
Money transfer company 1 1 2
  .8% .8% .8%
Agent into my bank account 13 17 30
  9.8% 13.2% 11.5%
Agent - had to collect it 4 6 10
  3.0% 4.7% 3.8%
Agent to the house 5 1 6
  3.8% .8% 2.3%
Other 7 8 15
  5.3% 6.2% 5.7%
Total 132 129 261
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
Table 18: Explanation for the mode of money transfer, 2005 and 2006 
  
 2005 2006 Total 
Cheapest 3 9 12
Safest / most secure 19 25 44
Most convenient 49 35 84
Fastest 11 6 17
Other 36 37 73
Total 118 112 230
 
 
Most respondents who answered specifically why the sender chooses this method cited 
exchange rates: the low official rate as compared to the competitive parallel market rate. 
They had memories of the time when The Government of Zimbabwe closed the Bureau 
de Change, the Western Union offices and the earlier period when Western Union was 
only allowed to pay out in local currency. When we asked whether the remitter had 
always used the particular method given, more than a quarter reported that they had 
changed their transit mode, suggesting that in a market which relies on trust, people 
were quite ready, or were forced to, change their behaviour relatively frequently. 
  
 
Table 19: Changes in method of transit, 2005 and 2006  
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Yes 88 91 179
  70.4% 74.6% 72.5%
No 37 31 68
  29.6% 25.4% 27.5%
125 122 247Total 
100% 100% 100%
 
 
Predominantly, however, money was received in person rather than remotely – and this 
had increased since 2005. In 2006, 22.7 per cent of transactions were carried out 
remotely, as compared to 30.5 per cent in 2005, while in 2006 a full 75 per cent of 
persons recorded that they had received their money ‘in person’, as compared to 67.2 
per cent in 2005. Moreover, of the exchanges conducted in person, more were 
transacted in foreign exchange in 2006 than in 2005, with 48.5 per cent and 29.8 per 
cent received in forex for the two years respectively. This suggests that not only were 
families increasingly not willing to use remote, unknown, or institutional means of 
conduit, they were also becoming more averse to using those same means to exchange 
the money into local currency at some point along its transit: whether in transit from a 
domiciled bank in the UK (forex) to a local business distributor (thus securing along the 
way the externalisation of local profits from Zim$ to forex); or by using a street level 
money changer on the way from the airport to home. Instead, they were increasingly 
taking the foreign exchange with them door to door. Correspondingly, the number of in 
person transactions carried out in Zim$ dropped from 64.9 per cent in 2005 to 50.5 per 
cent in 2006, indicating some dollarisation in the economy. This observation that 
dollarisation of the parallel remittance economy was in evidence even between 2005 and 
 2006, could be expected given the hyper inflation rates pertaining at the time and the 
actual physical shortage of bank notes.  
 
The increase in person transactions is probably also related, however, to the proximity 
factor (to and from South Africa), given that an increased number of our remitters are 
more proximate than in the 2005 data set. Communication between remitters is easier (it 
is a day’s journey), and probably regular, while the need for institutions and ‘middlemen’ 
reduces commensurately. It is difficult to disaggregate the effects on the mode of transit 
of the security environment and general economic context, from the demographic and 
locations of remitters themselves, although the data on how security is cited as a larger 
determinant suggests that it is not only the logistics of the transit and proximity of South 
Africa that are in play. Local remittances would also be sensitive to security and trust in 
transmission, and crime levels show an upward trend. There was also a ban on MTAs 
during the survey period.  
 
When asked what they did with the money first, an increased number in 2006 (20.4 per 
cent) reported paying it in to a bank account (as opposed to 6.2 per cent in 2005), 
although this might be a consequence of more of the money having been received in 
person in the first instance.  It is also perhaps indicative of the surveillance pertaining in 
the banking sector and the partial criminalisation of remittances, which would undermine 
the safety of a cross-border deposit, even when the receiver has an actual preference for 
the money to be in a bank: that is, it would need to be brought into the country 
clandestinely as foreign exchange, changed into local currency, and then deposited. Of 
those receiving money in foreign exchange, the mode of exchange into Zim$, by far the 
most preferred method, was to use a money changer known to the household, which 
mode had increased from 15.1 per cent to 40.2 per cent from 2005 to 2006. Casually 
meeting people to exchange money had dropped as a preference – from 11.3 per cent 
to 3.4 per cent - again reflecting criminalisation of the transaction, alongside a 
heightened state security presence surrounding the changing of the currency in Autumn 
2006. 
 
Table 20: Money changing, 2005 and 2006 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Commercial Bank 5 5 10
  9.4% 5.7% 7.1%
Money changing shop 1 1 2
  1.9% 1.1% 1.4%
Known money changer 8 35 43
  15.1% 40.2% 30.7%
Recommended money changer 7 7 14
  13.2% 8.0% 10.0%
Casually met money changer 6 3 9
  11.3% 3.4% 6.4%
Other4 26 36 62
  49.1% 41.4% 44.3%
Total 53 87 140
                                                 
4 Most ‘other’ are specified as ‘received in Zim$ 
  100% 100% 100%
 
 
When asked what they then spent the money on a full 90 per cent of the full sample 
recorded multiple answers, but when the choices were asked separately 57 per cent 
recalled having spent received money on food in 2006, up from 49.6 per cent in 2005, 
with a constant 95 per cent agreeing that they ‘could now not be hungry’ as a 
consequence in both years. In 2006, 19.5 per cent said they spent some of the money 
on clothing or footwear, constant with 18.6 per cent in 2005. The appreciation of 
households buying food could be due to increased local food costs and periodic 
shortages. The inflationary factor also looms large here and needs to be taken into 
account: it was in four digits throughout the 2006 survey period. It was 1, 500 per cent in 
July 2006 
 
9: People within the households 
 
We asked how many people the remittances were supporting in the household, and the 
2006 results were similar to those recorded in 2005. 
 
 
Table 21: Number of people supported in their basic needs in 2005 and 2006 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
None 6 0 6
  4.5% .0% 2.3%
Just myself 10 13 23
  7.6% 10.2% 8.8%
Myself and one other 29 30 59
  22.0% 23.4% 22.7%
Less than 5 people 60 64 124
  45.5% 50.0% 47.7%
5 to 10 people 22 19 41
  16.7% 14.8% 15.8%
11 to 20 people 1 2 3
  .8% 1.6% 1.2%
Other 4 0 4
  3.0% .0% 1.5%
Total 132 128 260
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
The number of households receiving financial assistance from elsewhere was also 
constant, although there was a slight observable rise in households receiving assistance 
from the World Food Programme and Government of Zimbabwe, reflecting deepening 
poverty, and increased food assistance to urban areas by donors and public authorities. 
 Interestingly, the ‘other’ category far exceeds all the others in who is providing this other 
assistance.5 
 
Table 22: Assistance received by households, 2005 and 2006 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Yes 49 49 98
  16.7% 17.1% 16.9%
No 238 237 475
  81.2% 82.9% 82.0%
Don't know / Refusal 6 0 6
  2% .0% 1.1%
Total 293 286 579
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 
Table 23: Forms of assistance received from households in 2005 and 2006 
 
 2005 2006 Total 
Church 20 18 38
  13.2% 7.9% 10.0%
Charity - Zimbabwean 5 6 11
  3.3% 2.6% 2.9%
Charity - Foreign 1 1 2
  .7% .4% .5%
World Food Programme / UN 2 6 8
  1.3% 2.6% 2.1%
Government 8 16 24
  5.3% 7.0% 6.3%
Other 116 181 297
  76.3% 79.4% 78.2%
Total 152 228 380
 100% 100% 100%
 
 
 
10. Wider implications of the data on informality and governance 
 
Poverty reduction, in multi-dimensional terms (see (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003; Green 
and Hulme, 2005; Clark, 2005), has been evidenced by migrant remittance receipt in the 
data gathered from our survey. However, this must be considered in relation to indirect 
                                                 
5 The hypothetical question of what people would do with gifts of money was asked in 2006, as were 
questions of what goods were sent. Because of pressure of space we will cover these elsewhere. 
 
 
 
 effects, such as inflation, which occur as a consequence, at least in part, of the 
informalisation and dollarisation within the economy, which is in turn exacerbated by 
remittances.  Not only are their zimdollar receipts subject to constant devaluation, but 
remittance receivers have also experienced expulsion and government extortion as a 
consequence of their positionality in the ‘political economy of displacement’ (see 
Hammar and Raftopolous, 2007, mimeo, for a discussion of this term). In this sense, the 
quantitative data from our research triangulates the interpretative findings of work from 
social anthropologists and sociologists on coping and getting by in deleterious 
governance circumstances (see for example Little, 2003; Trefon, 2005): that is, that 
ameliorative networks and social capital are formed, but not without struggle and 
reaction from the state. Thus, avoiding pressure from the government to surrender 
receipts into the formal system - and to subsequently lose 9/10th of their potential value 
at the official exchange rate - does not mean that the market value of remittances stays 
constant at the parallel rent. They are also subjected to hyper inflation. 
 
A high degree of economic informality was observed in our survey, more than in 2005, 
and also a considerable degree when compared to other studies. El-Qorchi et al (2003) 
estimated unofficial transfers of remittances to the developing world at $10 billion per 
year, but other estimates have ranged from between 35 percent to 250 percent of total 
remittances (Freud and Spatafora, 2005: 1). With the application of what they term the 
‘first empirical methodology to estimate informal flows’, Freud and Spatafora use 
historical data on the balance of payments (BOP), figures on migration, transaction costs 
and country characteristics for over 100 countries, ‘supplemented with household survey 
data’, to conclude that informal remittances amount to about 35-75 percent of official 
remittances to developing countries (2005, 1). It would appear from our data, derived 
from the percent of households reporting use of the official or formal system, that 
informal remittances range between 90 and 95 per cent for Zimbabwe. 
 
The consensus view is that informal remittances to sub-Saharan Africa, encouraged by 
dual exchange rates, are relatively high (Freud and Spatafora, 2005: 4; Aggarwal and 
Spatafora, 2005). Some micro-level field studies have also indicated that informal or in-
kind transfers are substantial globally (Massey and Parrado, 1994; see also Puri and 
Ritzema, 1999; reviewed in Gammeltoft, 2002), including in the DRC (Sumata, 2002: 
622), Somalia (Ahmed, 2006) and Zimbabwe (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006). DfID 
(2002) assert that informal remittances currently represent twice or three times the 
amount of formally transferred funds globally, which might be conservative relative to the 
poorest countries, as this case study suggests.  Widening disparities between official 
and unofficial exchange rates in some sub-Saharan African countries, the maturing of 
international migrant populations and the increase in electronic transfer could all 
augment these estimates.  
 
The use of informal and formal has been discussed in specialist literature on the 
(in)formal sector (reviewed by Gёrxhani, 2004), while the informal sector is also 
ambiguous in its actual economic effects (Ranis and Stewart, 1999). The data from 
Zimbabwe suggests that within the ‘informal’ category, there was a greater reliance on 
known persons and relatives, rather than commercial companies, in goods and money 
transit, suggesting that ‘informalisation’ can take distinct forms (Bracking and 
Sachikonye, 2006: 24-27). These distinct forms in turn relate to the social positioning of 
recipients, and feed into political economies of corruption, collapse, rentierism and 
externalisation of funds in failing states. Thus understanding the role of remittances 
within illiberal states, requires reference to wider cultural norms, embedded institutional 
 practices (see Granovetter, 1985), within traditional or indigenous sites of reciprocal 
exchange, as examined, but also essentialised, by Chabal and Deloz (1999; reviewed in 
MacLean, 2002: 517 – 520: see also Savage and Harvey, 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, political economy accounts of the roots of nefarious government, the most 
proximate cause of informalisation, have also been attributed to structural adjustment 
processes (Harris-White and White, 1996; Szeftel, 1998) which legitimised the 
accumulation of private wealth (Harrison, 1999: 542-3; Chingono, 1996: 82; on 
Mozambique: Bracking, 1999; Dansereau et al, 2005; Bond and Manyanya, 2002, on 
Zimbabwe) while creating new opportunities for spoils politics (see Allen, 1999) through 
privatisation (see Tangri and Mwenda on Uganda, 2001).  Rapid and unstable socio-
economic liberalisation has spurred ‘boundary politics’ exercised “between the national 
and the global economy; between the public functionary and the citizen” (Harrison, 1999: 
537), where contests over resources have become illiberal and subject to corruption and 
violence. Research on the effect of remittances within states experiencing nefarious 
government, where informalisation is ubiquitous, are few, although a recent collection by 
Savage and Harvey (2007) reviewed the role of remittances in failing states and within 
humanitarian crises.  
 
However, from these accounts we can deduce that neo-patrimonialism (see Bratton and 
van de Walle, 1994: 458-9) does appear to set a precedent for ruling elites to view 
remittance recipients’ money as somehow deserving or belonging to them, the natural 
patriotic leaders of the nation, such that punitive taxation regimes and spurious taxes are 
often devised to capture some of the income sent by migrants. In other words, Bayart’s 
pays legal is used to incrementally subvert the poverty reducing potential of private 
transfers, using the pays reel where real power is wielded (see 2000: 229-230, on the 
two spheres). Maclean (2002, citing Clapham, 1998) recently reviewed and applied the 
‘political economy of conflict’ approach to understanding the deterioration of governance 
in Zimbabwe, arguing that sovereignty provides “access to outside sources of wealth as 
well as a protective shield behind which the sources and beneficiaries of that wealth 
could remain obscure” (2002: 517), which in some part explains the ideological defense 
of the acquisition of remittances by means of state policy. In more extreme cases Allen 
describes a ‘spoils politics’ model which can lead to eventual state collapse (1999, 367), 
where global marginalisation, citing Duffield, gives “local actors the chance to rework the 
nature of political authority” (Duffield, 1998: 82), dislocating it from “conventional 
territorial, bureaucratic or consent-based structures” (Duffield, 1998: 97).  
 
Within this more extreme spoils politics model, the capture of private remittances by the 
political class would be commensurate with the functionality and form of other political 
relationships with the majority poor. In other words, it would seem like ‘common sense’ 
that the Reserve Bank should capture them, even at a derisory official exchange rate. 
This research has provided evidence for the viability of this spoils politics model in the 
current context, to explain the mode of governmentality prevailing in Zimbabwe, and the 
role of remittances in contributing to the funding of that state form. This context 
undermines the pecuniary value of remittances over time, by reproducing chronic 
scarcity in goods markets, and by failing the citizens in terms of the welfare prerogatives 
of liberal government to the poor.  
 
Indeed, there is also a multidimensional political economy relationship between the 
micro-level remittance economy, and acts of kleptocracy by the ruling elite, because of 
the sheer magnitude of the former, and the lucrative rents and profits to be found in 
 money changing and money supply in transactional exchange between the informal and 
formal economy6.  Events in late 2007, surrounding a more recent replacement of the 
money stock, revealed ‘cash barons’ at the heart of government, while some banks 
which facilitate parallel market exchange are rumoured to be owned by top officials 
within the ruling party. These relationships between various social actors have the 
potential to be successfully modelled within a ‘political economy of dispossession’ 
paradigm. The political economy of decline in Zimbabwe (Dansereau and Zamponi, 
2005) has a specific historiography, rather than being isomorphic to other states, but 
there are similarities around the role of internally and internationally displaced people 
and the remittance economy they create. The dispossession of the rural and urban poor 
and informal sector traders during the ‘land reform’ process and Operation 
Murambatsvina (see Potts, 2006), has been accompanied by a dispossession of the 
middle and professional classes caused by economic contraction in the formal economy, 
to create a political economy where the majority people’s dispossession has created 
economic opportunities for others, the core elite and the party faithful7.  
 
11. Conclusion 
 
We have explored a small snapshot of change between November 2005 and November 
2006 in the remittance economy of Zimbabwe and observed a general decline in the 
trust required to facilitate remote economic exchange. There was no observable build up 
of the commercial informal sector during the year, but rather an increase in, and further 
deepening of the privatisation of economic exchange. It is probable that while both 
commercial informal sector institutions and familial networks can work relatively 
autonomously from the state, it is the capture of the former by members of the political 
class which has pressurised increased recourse into the latter, the more private family 
networks. There was also some evidence of dollarisation, which again suggests a 
greater schism between state and society, even since 2005. It is clear from the 
triangulation from qualitative data collected along with the surveys that informalization in 
2006 continued to be affected by the Operation Murambatsvina of 2005. However, while 
trust may have been affected in relations between remitters and receivers, it may be only 
tentatively posited as a critical factor given that most respondents in the 2006 survey 
were not the same as those surveyed in 2005. 
 
We also observed a decline in remittance receipts in the low density suburbs of Harare, 
an increase in receipts in the high density suburbs of Bulawayo and an increase in 
remitters in South Africa relative to the UK. The emotional and social effects of 
loneliness and isolation caused by relatives’ absences were still being felt acutely. In 
general, we suggest that to the extent to which the Zimbabwean economy as a whole is 
dependent on corporeal, physical and/or material dispossessions – and the resulting 
assets made available and remittances sent - it can be characterised as a political 
economy of dispossession. It remains for us to continue to theorize the economic effects 
of the remittance economy, alongside its political consequences, despite neither of these 
                                                 
6 It would be useful to compare patterns amongst internal and external remitters in this respect. There may 
be patterns emerging on size and regularity of remittances. Because of pressure of space we have not done 
that here. 
 
7 Harris-White (2005) explored how the existence of one person’s destitution creates relatively more 
resources for someone else, while Harvey, (2003a, 2003b) summarised in Bond (2006: 7-9) modelled these 
into processes within an ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Both these authors influenced the work here. 
 
 being methodologically very easy, in order to ensure that the individual sacrifices being 
made are resulting in the most benefit possible to those left behind, and ultimately to 
members of the Diaspora as well. In sum, the international remittance network is 
sponsoring social change alongside its important work of social survival, but of what 
types and with what consequences remains unclear.   
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